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Los esquemas de política fiscal son cada vez más frecuentes en gobiernos que aspiran a 
estabilizar el ciclo económico y aumentar la resiliencia de las finanzas públicas frente a las 
presiones políticas. Este artículo presenta una amplia exploración empírica de las 
explicaciones posibles a la elección de régimen de política fiscal en los países.  Además, se 
conforma y utiliza un amplio conjunto de datos de panel mundial para el trato y control de 
grupos de países, aplicando técnicas de estimación de datos de panel para variables 
dependientes de elección discreta, y se realizan pruebas de robustez para distintos grupos 
de control y períodos de tiempo. La evidencia muestra que la probabilidad de tener un 
régimen fiscal en vigor aumenta robusta y significativamente con el equilibrio fiscal, la 
estabilidad del gobierno y el PIB per cápita, y disminuye con el coeficiente de dependencia 






Fiscal policy regimes are increasingly adopted by governments that aim at contributing to 
stabilize business cycles and make public finances more resilient to political pressure. This 
paper presents a comprehensive empirical exploration of the possible explanations of why 
countries choose fiscal policy regimes. The paper puts together and uses a large world panel 
dataset for treatment and control country groups, applies five panel-data estimation 
techniques for discrete-choice dependent variables, and conducts robustness checks for 
different control groups and time periods. The paper’s evidence shows that the likelihood of 
having a fiscal regime in place increases significantly and robustly with the government 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The old debate on the role of macroeconomic policy in the economy stabilization was 
divided between those people who believe in the supremacy of monetary policy as the key 
economic policy tool and those that restate the effectiveness of fiscal policy on fostering 
aggregate demand though to the operation of the so-called multiplier effects. 
The literature, in general, has been influenced by the first advocates. Thus, early, 
Friedman (1968) proposed the money-growth constant rule for monetary policy due to the 
fact that monetary policy lags were so long and variable. Later, Taylor (1993) unveiled the 
practice of monetary policy in the U.S. by noting that Fed seems to move the interest 
policy rate as a function of deviation of GDP and inflation rate from target values or 
potential levels, spawning the explosion of the Taylor-rule literature in the academic realm. 
Fiscal matters, instead, have received less attention mainly in the theoretical ground
1 
and perhaps, consequently, the same occurred in the fiscal rules area. 
Perhaps, the more prominent example of fiscal rules is the set of guidelines in fiscal 
matters contained in the Maastricht convergence criteria, and later in the Stability and 
Growth Pact of 1997 for European countries. Theses guidelines establish that the 
government budget deficit should not be in excess of 3 percent of each country-member 
GDP and that the gross debt to GDP ratio should not excess 60 percent. These can be 
considered as flow and stock fiscal rules, respectively. 
It is not surprising that the application of fiscal rules based on targeting of flows (e.g. 
numerical targets on fiscal deficits or ceilings imposed on fiscal expenditure) and/or stocks 
(e.g. ceilings applied to debt to GDP ratio) can results fruitless for an intertemporal and 
countercyclical policy view. The use of this kind of fiscal rules has been spurred mainly in 
the developed world (e.g. United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden and New Zealand) as a 
tool for being neutral during the cycle. Recently, Chile in 2001 adopts a structural fiscal rule 
following a same reasoning but also taking into account the deviation of cooper price for 
its permanent value. 
Even tough the benefits of applying fiscal rules are well-known (since the contribution 
of Kydland and Prescott in 1977) the study of possible macroeconomic and institutional 
determinants behind the choice of a fiscal regime has been an unexplored area. In this 
paper, we try to fill this void by providing a comprehensive assessment of the determinants 
                                                 
1 Cochrane (2000) restate the role of fiscal policy focusing in a particular area, say the price level determination.   2
suggested by theory and the empirical practice in the likelihood of adopting a fiscal regime 
(in form of a flow, stock or even, countercyclical regime). 
The paper is laid out as follows. The next section introduces the general specification 
for the probability of having a fiscal regime in place and describes the panel-data methods 
for discrete-choice dependent variables that are applied subsequently. Section 3 describes 
the data and stylized facts reflected by descriptive statistics and correlations. Estimation 
results are reported subsequently. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Specification and Estimation Technique 
 
Our general specification for the choice of a fiscal regime (that is, the likelihood of 
having a fiscal regime in place) broadens the set of potential determinants of the latter 
choice proposed by us. We start with a wide set of pre-conditions, which have been partly 
identified in the related theoretical literature. Table 1 list the full set of regressors used in 
this paper, identifying expected and estimated coefficient signs.  
We allow for the role of institutional variables proxied by two measures. The first one 
is perhaps the most direct measure for the capability of a government for staying at office 
by carrying out serious and non-popular policy guidelines. The other variable is broader 
and consequently we expect that if included, it could compromise the empirical role of the 
rest of variables. We also control for some variables considered as structural, like the 
government balance, dependency ratio and the expenditure procyclicality.  
Regarding the results, we expect that fiscal surplus raises the likelihood of adopting a 
fiscal regime as it is easier to adopt a fiscal regime when fiscal accounts are equilibrated or 
exhibit a favorable gap. Moreover, as the dependency ratio and expenditure procyclicality 
are included for taking into account structural preconditions for adopting a fiscal regime, 
we expected that positive/high values of these variables were associated to a positive 
likelihood for not adopting such a regime, reflecting an immature stadium for 
implementing fiscal rules. Finally, we expect that highly institutionalized and stable 
governments would be more prone to adopt a fiscal regime. 
 We exploit the cross-section and time dimensions of our world sample by using panel-
data estimation techniques. The general specification of our regression model for the 
likelihood of having fiscal regime in place is as follows: 
 
t i, t i, i t i, ε X δ' μ Y + + =    (1)   3
 
where Y is a vector of discrete-choice country-year variables for the fiscal regime (a dummy 
that takes a value of 1 for having a fiscal regime in place, 0 otherwise), X is a matrix of 
country-year explanatory variables that were introduced above, μ is a vector of individual 
country effects that reflect unobservable country heterogeneity, δ is a vector of slope 
coefficients that are common to all countries, ε is a vector of error terms, and i and t are 
country and time indexes, respectively. 
  Equation (1) is estimated using discrete-choice panel-data models, assuming either a 
logistic distribution (a logit model) or a normal distribution (a probit model) of the error 
term. 
Any source of unobservable heterogeneity that may explain the decision of whether to 
adopt a fiscal regime is captured by individual country effects. The first approach to deal 
with this setup would be estimating individual effects jointly with the model’s slope 
parameters. However, this practice has the problem that the joint estimation of country 
effects and slope parameters causes inconsistency of the latter in an asymptotic plan with 
large N and finite T (which is our case), a result due to Neyman and Scott (1948) and 
known as the incidental parameters problem. The incidental parameters are in this case the 
fixed effects because they compromise the large sample properties of δ
2. In discrete-choice 
panel-data models the removal of the fixed effects is not as easy as in the linear panel-data 
model (e.g. the within estimator) and the strategy for doing so hinges on the specification 
of the model.
3 The basic fixed-effects discrete- choice panel-data estimator is known as the 
Conditional Logit Estimator (CLE) due to Andersen (1970) and extended by Chamberlain 
(1980).
4 
CLE evaluates the likelihood function as conditional on sufficient statistics that restrict 
estimation to those individuals whose choice varies over time. This means that CLE only 
                                                 
2 It could be argued that this asymptotic plan does not hold in a country panel data set since we 
know that N is fixed and T could be very large. However, it seems to be that the large sample 
properties do not depend on the physical properties and that it is enough to have N larger than T. 
We thank Manuel Arellano for this clarification. 
3 See Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) for an analysis of the conditions for removing fixed effects in 
dynamic discrete choice models. 
4 It is worth emphasizing that the extension of this method to the case of normally distributed 
errors is unfeasible in practice because it involves evaluation of many integrals, which is very 
computer-intensive.   4
considers individual movers in the likelihood function.
5 Therefore the drawback of CLE is 
that sample size is reduced by all individuals that are stayers over the sample period time. 
The panel-data literature distinguishes between fixed and random-effects estimators. In 
the case of discrete-choice models, selection between the two latter estimators is 
determined by different aspects than those found for linear models. CLE, the only feasible 
fixed-effects estimator for discrete-choice panel data, eliminates individual effects. The 
random effects estimator does not remove individual country effects; it assumes a typically 
normal distribution between individual effects and the variables of the model, using for the 
latter purpose semi non-parametric simulation techniques. Discrete-choice random effects 
for panel data is feasible available for both logit and normal distributions of the error term. 
Hence the trade-off between the fixed-effects CLE and the random-effects estimator 
for discrete-choice panel-data is the benefit of robustness of the former (as it is not 
restricted by any assumption on the joint distribution of individual effects and explanatory 
variables) and the benefit of larger sample size of the latter. 
Finally our estimation model is subject to potential endogeneity bias. For example, 
adoption of a fiscal regime may strengthen the fiscal position or act in favor of a counter-
cyclical fiscal position– two key potential determinants of having a fiscal regime in place. 
Recent theoretical contributions by Arellano and Carrasco (2003) deal with this issue in the 
context of discrete-choice panel-data models using instrumental variables techniques, 
respectively. Yet the stringent assumptions on which the latter solutions rely are not very 




3.  Data and Stylized Facts 
 
Before turning to the regression results in the next section, we describe briefly our 
sample data, focusing on their distribution and pair-wise simple correlations.
 6 Table 2 lists 
111 countries that comprise our full sample by income groups. Figure 1 depicts the time 
tend of our dependent variable: the number of countries with a fiscal regime during the full 
time sample. These countries grew from less than 5 countries during most of 70s and 80s 
                                                 
5 In order to clarify the notion of a sufficient statistic consider the case of a binary choice panel-data 
set with two periods (T=2). A sufficient statistic is given by a sum of observations equal to 1, since 
only in this case we know that the possible pairs are (0,1) and (1,0). Therefore the conditional fixed-
effects estimator only considers individuals with choices that sum unity for all (two) periods. 
6 Data sources and definitions are discussed in the data appendix.   5
to 30 countries 15 years later. Indeed, this number starts to increase at the beginning of 
90s. 
Figure 2 (3) plots the country distributions of five independent variables for the full 
sample (separately for countries with and without a fiscal regime) by box plots. The boxes 
in each box plot account for all observations within the 25-50 and 50-75 percentile range of 
variable distribution. Medians are reported as thin white lines inside each box. Outliers – 
observations falling outside the 25-75 percentile ranges – are depicted as dots. 
The following stylized facts emerge from Figure 2. The first panel report government 
budget balance ratio to GDP reflecting a trend increase in its median and reduction in its 
dispersion, consistent with fiscal strengthening observed in industrial and developing 
countries alike since the 1980s. Dependency ratio reflects an increase in its asymmetry as 
shown by the decreasing median across the time, with a slightly reduction in its dispersion 
during the last decade. Government stability exhibits an interesting pattern across the time. 
In the middle of 90s this qualitative measure reflects a time break around this period 
reflecting a change in the perception of the capability of governments to stay in office by 
fulfilling their main policy guidelines around the world. Expenditure procyclicality are 
biased toward positive values (hence, showing that a procyclical fiscal policy is a general 
pattern), although the median is corrected towards a more equally balanced distribution in 
the last decade. World median growth is reflected by the trend rise in the median per-capita 
GDP level, with little change in cross-country GDP dispersion over time. 
Now let’s turn to a comparison of medians and dispersions observed by the five latter 
independent variables in the treatment and control groups of country-year observations 
(Figure 3). It is difficult to arrive to clear conclusions on the comparison between medians 
across the choice of having or not in place a fiscal regime. We can say only that countries 
with some fiscal regime have a lower dependency ratio than countries without a fiscal 
regime. 
Now we turn to the last piece of descriptive data statistics: cross-country and panel-
data pair-wise correlations between our model variables reported in the upper and lower 
diagonal matrixes in Table 3, respectively. Three results emerge. First, there is not much 
difference between cross-country and panel-data correlation coefficients. Second, 
correlations between the fiscal regime dummy and most independent variables are 
significant and exhibit expected signs. Finally only two pairs of correlations between 
regressors are highly significant and large: it is the -0.8 correlation between dependency 
ratio and per-capita GDP (at both dimensions) and the 0.6 correlation between   6
government stability and GDP per-capita (only in the cross-section calculations). The latter 
correlations figures should be kept in mind when discussing our results below. 
 
 
4.  Empirical results 
 
We report estimation results for the choice of a fiscal regime (the likelihood of having a 
fiscal regime in place), based on equation (1). Our empirical strategy starts with reporting 
full-sample results for different specifications based on fixed and random-effects probit 
m o d e l s  ( T a b l e  4 ) .  T h e n  w e  t e s t  f o r  r o b u s t ness by broadening our use of estimation 
techniques, reporting results based on pooled logit and probit models (which do not 
account for country heterogeneity), and on the random-effects probit model (Table 5). 
Subsequently we test our model for different sub-samples comprised by country groups 
according to income levels (Table 6) and a shorter time period (Table 7). We discuss the 
results subsequently. 
Table 4 reports estimation results for 3 fixed-effect and 3 random-effect specifications, 
based on logit estimations. This set of specifications arises because we consider two 
alternative measures for the degree of institutional development. We report results coming 
for considering both measures.  
The stiff trade-off between fixed-effect and random-effect results – robustness of the 
former versus larger sample size of the latter – is reflected by the large sample size 
difference in our results (some 712 country-year observations for fixed-effect and 2055 
observations for random-effect estimations). The treatment group is the same under fixed 
and random effects – it is comprised by all country-year observations of countries with 
fiscal regime since their starting dates. Under fixed effects, the full sample is comprised 
only by those countries only – hence the control group is comprised only by fiscal regime 
country observations before they started the regime. In contrast, under random effects, the 
control group is broadened to include all country-year observations of 51 non-fiscal regime 
countries. Hence one should exercise care in comparing results across estimations based on 
such large differences in control groups and overall sample size. 
We find significant evidence for the influence of our five variables on having a fiscal 
regime in place. This evidence is generally robust across fixed-effects and random-effects 
estimations, notwithstanding their large sample differences.  
The first variable – government budget balance – is reflected by a positive, highly 
significant coefficient. Dependency ratio and our measure of expenditure procyclicality   7
exhibit the expected signs and are highly significant, as well. Hence, countries with a high 
proportion of dependent people (less than 15-year and older than 64) have a positive 
likelihood for not adopting a fiscal regime, reflecting the influence of child-care and 
pension programs as government responsibilities. This likelihood is also positive for 
countries whose fiscal expenditure commoves positively with output. These latter variables 
reflect the fact that in the near future, these kinds of countries have not the institutional 
tools for carrying out fiscal reforms in order to achieve a sustainable fiscal policy. Our 
alternative institutional variables also have the expected signs showing that stable 
governments are more prone to adopt a fiscal regime.  
Next we broaden our search for robustness by subjecting several specifications to 
alternative estimation techniques. To a selective sub-set of our previous estimations, we 
add results for pooled data (without controlling for country heterogeneity), using both logit 
and probit models, and for random effects using a probit model (Table 5). For robustness 
analysis, we also report results for a logit-model random-effects estimation using the same 
(small) sample to which the comparable logit-model fixed-effects estimation is restricted.  
We derive two conclusions from these results. First, results in table 5 mimic, in terms of 
signs and statistical significance, those findings we sketched referring to table 4. Second, 
when we use the fixed-effect estimator, government balance is no longer significance, 
which is a similar result found when we run the random-effect regression with the 
restricted sample.  
Extending our search for robustness using different control groups, we reduce our full- 
sample control-group comprised by all countries without a fiscal regime (results re-stated 
for comparison in columns 1-4 of Table 6) by focusing sequentially on results based on 
countries without a fiscal regime by income levels (results reported in columns 5-10 in table 
6).
7 Most results remain largely unchanged, supporting robustness to different control 
groups. The one exception is the government balance, which turns out to be significant in 
our baseline regressions but is not significant when we vary the control group. 
Next we focus on a shorter time period, starting in 1990 throughout our sample’s end-
year (2005). The estimation is based on the full country sample available under random 
effects.
 8  The results, reported in columns 5-8 of Table 7, confirm significance of 
dependency ratio, expenditure procyclicality, government stability and GDP per-capita but 
reject a strong significant contribution of the government balance in the random-effect 
                                                 
7 We report only random-effects estimation results because fixed-effects estimation excludes all countries 
without fiscal regime, as discussed above. 
8 We were not able of obtaining convergence for fixed-effects estimations.   8
setup. Instead, this latter variable becomes not significant when we run fixed-effects 
estimations.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, which is unique to the best of our knowledge, we find empirical evidence 
on the role of variables that summarize the capability of governments and structural issues 
for applying fiscal rules. Thus, variables associated to the degree of institutional 
development (i.e. government stability and GDP per-capita) play a role in favor of the 
probability of adopting a fiscal regime. Moreover, a high dependency ratio and a fiscal 
expenditure which commoves positively with output are included for reflecting the fact 
that not prepared countries are less prone to adopt a fiscal regime. Hence, previous fiscal 
reforms are needed for implementing successfully fiscal rules. 
These results are quite robust to alternative specifications, econometric methods and 
time samples. The only one exception in government balance which becomes not 
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7.  Data Appendix 
 
We construct an annual panel data set comprised of 111 countries for the period 1975-
2005. See the list of countries in table 2. 
For the dependent variable we construct a dummy variable which is set equal to 1 if the 
country has in place any form of fiscal rule (based on flows, stocks or countercyclical), and 
0 otherwise. Our classification relies mainly in the classification found in Kopits and 
Simansky (1998), Kopits (2001), Kopits (2004) and OECD. 
For the right-hand side variables we use primarily the Word Bank data set (World 
Development Indicators) because it seems to be a revised version of the IFS database 
constructed by the IMF. This is the case for the dependency ratio and GDP per capita.  
The overall budget balance is assembled based on the Government Financial Statistics 
(prepared by the IMF), the Economist Intelligence Unit and figures found in official 
government’s web pages. The measure of government stability is taken for the ICRG 
database. We construct a measure for expenditure procyclicality as the rolling correlation 
coefficient between fiscal expenditure and GDP in local currency. These variables were 
obtained from the IFS database. 
The details on the construction and the sources of all these variables we used in the 
estimations are shown in table 1.  
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Table 1: Determinants of choice of fiscal regimes 
 
 






Government overall budget 
balance 
GFS and 
EIU  Positive Positive 
Dependency ratio 
Dependents to working-age 
population. Dependents are 
people younger than 15 or 
older than 64. Working-age 
population is people ages 
between 15 and 64. 
WDI (2007) Negative  Negative 
Government 
stability 
It reflects the government's 
ability to carry out its declared 
programs, and its ability to stay 
in office. It is the sum of 3 
categories (0-4, with low 
values for high risk). The sub-
components are: government 
unity, legislative strength, and 
popular support. It assigns a 









Calculated as the correlation 
between the HP-filtered 
figures for fiscal expenditure 
and GDP 
IFS (2007), 
IMF  Negative Negative 
GDP per capita  Log of the GDP per capita  WDI (2007) Positive  Positive 
 Source:  Own  elaboration 
 Notes: 
  WDI: Word Development Indicators 
  GFS: Government Financial Statistics 
  EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit 
  IFS: International Financial Statistics+ 
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High income OECD (24) 
AUS Australia FRA France JPN Japan PRT Portugal
AUT Austria DEU Germany KOR Korea ESP Spain
BEL Belgium GRC Greece LUX Luxembourg SWE Sweden
CAN Canada ISL Iceland NLD Netherlands CHE Switzerland
DNK Denmark IRL Ireland NZL New Zealand GBR United Kingdom
FIN Finland ITA Italy NOR Norway USA United States
High income non OECD (8) 
ISR Israel KWT Kuwait
ARE United Arab Emirates SAU Saudi Arabia
CYP Cyprus SGP Singapore
HKG Hong Kong SVN Slovenia
Upper middle income (23)
ARG Argentina HRV Croatia MYS Malaysia TTO Trinidad and Tobago
BWA Botswana EST Estonia OMN Oman TUR Turkey
CRI Costa Rica HUN Hungary PAN Panama URY Uruguay
CHL Chile LBN Lebanon POL Poland VEN Venezuela
CZE Czech Republic MEX Mexico ROM Romania ZAF South Africa
GAB Gabon MUS Mauritius SVK Slovak Republic
Lower middle income (27)
BRA Brazil DOM Dominican Republic IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. PRY Paraguay
BGR Bulgary DZA Algeria JAM Jamaica PHL Philippines
BOL Bolivia ECU Ecuador JOR Jordan SLV El Salvador
COL Colombia EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. LKA Sri Lanka SYR Syrian Arab Republic
CHN China GTM Guatemala MAR Morocco THA Thailand
CMR Cameroon HND Honduras NIC Nicaragua TUN Tunisia
COG Congo, Rep. IDN Indonesia PER Peru
Lower income (29)
BEN Benin HTI Haiti PAK Pakistan TZA Tanzania
BFA Burkina Faso IND India PNG Papua New Guinea UGA Uganda
BGD Bangladesh KEN Kenya RWA Rwanda ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep.
CIV Côte d'Ivoire MDG Madagascar SDN Sudan ZMB Zambia
ETH Ethiopia MLI Mali SEN Senegal ZWE Zimbabwe
GHA Ghana MWI Malawi SLE Sierra Leone
GIN Guinea NER Niger TCD Chad
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dummy regime 1 0.075 -0.355 0.277 -0.003 0.375
government 
budget balance
0.146 1 -0.247 0.226 0.183 0.251
dependency ratio -0.260 -0.219 1 -0.569 0.289 -0.852
government 
stability
0.184 0.173 -0.404 1 -0.255 0.630
expenditure 
procyclicaltilty
-0.010 0.017 0.126 -0.094 1 -0.228
GDP per capita 0.294 0.191 -0.808 0.366 -0.105 1
 
          Source: Own elaboration based on the WDI data set. 
          Numbers in bold denote correlation coefficients statistically significant at 5 percent at maximum 
Numbers in the inferior triangle are the cross correlations across the time and countries (pooled correlations) while the numbers in the superior triangle  
are cross correlations across countries (among time demeaned variables)   14
Table 4
Choice of Fiscal Regime: full sample estimations
Dependent variable: dummy for fiscal regime (with the regime=1, without the regime=0)
Estimation methods: Discrete choice panel data models
Sample: 1975-2005 (annual data)
12 3 4 56
Government budget balance 0.174 1.732 35.365 *** 8.337 11.785 * 36.811 ***
(0.03) (0.25) (6.79) (1.29) (1.87) (7.15)
Dependency ratio -54.833 *** -57.268 *** -51.562 *** -42.595 *** -45.096 *** -45.996 ***
(5.05) (5.33) (7.94) (5.37) (7.04) (7.59)
Expenditure procyclicality (10 years) -2.18 ** -1.990 ** -1.531 *** -2.195 *** -1.945 ** -1.362 ***
(2.38) (2.20) (3.23) (2.84) (2.51) (2.89)
Government stability 0.149 - 0.357 *** 0.262 ** - 0.377 ***
(1.27) - (4.40) (2.38) - (4.59)
GDP per capita 30.011 *** 31.507 *** - 23.33 *** 24.688 *** -
(7.50) (7.81) - (17.36) (17.77) -
Constant - - - -209.577 *** -217.869 *** 18.109 ***
- - - (14.47) (14.65) (5.35)
Observations 712 712 712 2005 2055 2005
Total number of countries 24 24 24 75 75 75
Countries with fiscal regime 24 24 24 24 24 24
Countries without fiscal regime 0 0 0 51 51 51
(control group)
LR statistic 529.3 527.7 310.4 477.3 604.0 113.8
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fixed Effects Random Effects  15
Table 5
Choice of Fiscal Regime: sensitivity to different estimation techniques
Dependent variable: dummy for fiscal regime (with the regime=1, without the regime=0)
Estimation methods: Discrete choice panel data models
Sample: 1975-2005 (annual data)
Preferred estimation techniques
1 2 34 56 789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Government budget balance 9.694 *** 9.927 *** 11.785 * 36.811 *** 10.398 36.358 *** 1.732 35.365 *** 5.154 *** 5.005 *** 6.652 * 20.353 ***
(5.29) (5.30) (1.87) (7.15) (1.49) (7.25) (0.25) (6.79) (5.11) (4.91) (1.85) (7.26)
Dependency ratio -3.914 *** -6.103 *** -45.096 *** -45.996 *** -53.662 *** -40.78 *** -57.268 *** -51.562 *** -1.899 *** -3.006 *** -25.127 *** -26.005 ***
(4.61) (9.97) (7.04) (7.59) (5.27) (6.78) (5.33) (7.94) (4.73) (10.22) (5.74) (7.70)
Expenditure procyclicality (10 years) 0.331 * 0.276 -1.945 ** -1.362 *** -2.155 ** -1.076 ** -1.990 ** -1.531 *** 0.217 ** 0.197 ** -0.748 * -0.823 ***
(1.78) (1.50) (2.51) (2.89) (2.52) (2.31) (2.20) (3.23) (2.16) (1.97) (1.86) (3.12)
Government stability - 0.134 *** - 0.377 *** - 0.362 *** - 0.357 *** - 0.079 *** - 0.202 ***
- (3.38) - (4.59) - (4.46) - (4.40) - (3.66) - (4.43)
GDP per capita 0.621 *** - 24.688 *** - 27.498 *** - 31.507 *** - 0.340 *** - 12.898 *** -
(4.79) - (17.77) - (7.63) - (7.81) - (5.37) - (8.36) -
Constant -4.831 *** 1.099 ** -217.869 *** 18.109 *** -234.775 *** 19.224 *** - - -2.852 *** 0.285 -113.450 *** 10.367 ***
(2.98) (1.98) (14.65) (5.35) (7.10) (5.74) - - (3.65) (0.99) (9.12) (5.41)
Observations 2005 2005 2055 2005 712 712 712 712 2055 2005 2055 2005
T o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 7 5 7 5 7 57 5 2 42 4 2 42 47 5 7 5 7 57 5
Countries with fiscal regime 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Countries without fiscal regime 51 51 51 51 0 0 0 0 51 51 51 51
(control group)
LR statistic 305.0 259.2 604.0 113.8 82.3 100.4 527.7 310.4 301.7 254.3 108.2 128.4
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Pooled Random effects
Logit panel data models Probit panel data models
Pooled  Random effects Fixed effects Random effects
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Table 6
Choice of Fiscal Regime: sensitivity to alternative control country groups
Dependent variable: dummy for fiscal regime (with the regime=1, without the regime=0)
Estimation methods: Discrete choice panel data models
Sample: 1975-2005 (annual data)
Different country control groups
12 34 56 78 9 1 0
Government budget balance 11.785 * 36.811 *** 1.732 35.365 *** 9.787 36.481 *** 9.205 36.946 *** 9.961 36.629 ***
(1.87) (7.15) (0.25) (6.79) (1.44) (7.13) (1.35) (7.20) (1.44) (7.19)
Dependency ratio -45.096 *** -45.996 *** -57.268 *** -51.562 *** -52.692 *** -43.292 *** -53.493 *** -44.983 *** -52.176 *** -43.107 ***
(7.04) (7.59) (5.33) (7.94) (7.21) (7.14) (5.53) (7.49) (7.00) (7.24)
Expenditure procyclicality (10 years) -1.945 ** -1.362 *** -1.990 ** -1.531 *** -2.271 *** -1.356 *** -2.231 ** -1.337 *** -2.236 *** -1.295 ***
(2.51) (2.89) (2.20) (3.23) (2.66) (2.87) (2.56) (2.84) (2.63) (2.74)
Government stability - 0.377 *** - 0.357 *** - 0.386 *** - 0.375 *** - 0.384 ***
- (4.59) - (4.40) - (4.71) - (4.58) - (4.69)
GDP per capita 24.688 *** - 31.507 *** - 28.052 *** - 29.045 *** - 27.925 *** -
(17.77) - (7.81) - (10.46) - (9.99) - (8.47) -
Constant -217.869 *** 18.109 *** - - -232.661 *** 20.383 *** -252.680 *** 19.056 *** -232.315 *** 21.227 ***
(14.65) (5.35) - - (8.67) (5.60) (10.13) (5.56) (7.33) (5.85)
Observations 2055 2055 712 712 952 937 1512 1492 1249 1204
Total number of countries 75 75 24 24 32 32 54 54 44 44
Countries with fiscal regime 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Countries without fiscal regime 51 51 0 0 8 8 30 30 20 20
(control group)
LR statistic 604.0 113.8 527.7 310.4 180.7 110.9 124.4 113.2 125.7 111.4
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
When we allow for different country control groups we consider both the countries that have the regime in place (movers) and those countries that have not experienced a regime change (stayers)
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Table 7
Choice of Fiscal Regime: sensitivity to alternative time samples
Dependent variable: dummy for fiscal regime (with the regime=1, without the regime=0)
Estimation methods: Discrete choice panel data models
Different time samples
12 3 4 56 78
Government budget balance 1.732 35.365 *** 11.785 * 36.811 *** 2.210 17.629 *** 12.388 * 20.397 ***
(0.25) (6.79) (1.87) (7.15) (0.31) (2.70) (1.71) (3.24)
Dependency ratio -57.268 *** -51.562 *** -45.096 *** -45.996 *** -53.454 *** -59.082 *** -48.226 *** -45.835 ***
(5.33) (7.94) (7.04) (7.59) (4.04) (5.41) (3.87) (5.06)
Expenditure procyclicality (10 years) -1.990 ** -1.531 *** -1.945 ** -1.362 *** -1.676 * -1.785 ** -1.702 * -1.223
(2.20) (3.23) (2.51) (2.89) (1.71) (2.29) (1.80) (1.63)
Government stability - 0.357 *** - 0.377 *** - 0.683 *** - 0.683 ***
- (4.40) - (4.59) - (6.20) - (6.27)
GDP per capita 31.507 *** - 24.688 *** - 28.908 *** - 23.287 ***
(7.81) - (17.77) - (6.85) - (5.99)
Constant - - -217.869 *** 18.109 *** - - -204.744 *** 16.171 ***
- - (14.65) (5.35) - - (5.51) (3.46)
Observations 712 712 2055 2005 384 384 1167 1166
Total number of countries 24 24 75 75 24 24 75 75
Countries with fiscal regime 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Countries without fiscal regime 0 0 51 51 0 0 51 51
(control group)
LR statistic 527.7 310.4 604.0 113.8 231.6 164.9 56.8 73.4
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
1990-2005 1975-2005 (full sample)
Fixed effects Random effects Random effects Fixed effects





Figure 1: Adoption of Fiscal Regimes 
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 Source:  Own elaboration 
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Figure 3: Fiscal Regime and Non-Fiscal Regime Country-year Distribution of 13 
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